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RECENT CASES

the complaint and refuse to grant an injunction, feeling that there was good faith,
and said that, because no one had warned the defendant before filing suit, his
actions did not warrant punitive action, and they felt confident that he would
refrain from future illegal practice.))
In determining whether a man is practicing law, his work for any particular
client or customer should be considered as a whole.1 2 An accountant may prepare
tax returns and answer incidental legal questions that arise in connection with
preparing tax returns, but may not be called in by a business or another accountant
to do nothing other than answer a legal question. The possible added inconvenience and expense of calling in a lawyer do not warrant a lessening of this
rule, for the considerations of public protection far outweigh these factors.) 3
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Plaintiff carried an accident insurance policy which provided that "Injury"
as used in the policy means bodily injury which is the sole cause of the loss and
which is effected solely through accidental means. Suicide was expressly excluded
from recovery under the policy. Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide by closing
all the windows and turning on the gas of her stove. She went to sleep and
awakened several hours later surprised to find herself still alive. She then turned
off the gas and attempted to light the pilot light. An explosion resulted which
injured her. She brought suit to recover under the insurance policy; Iowa District
Court allowed recovery and defendant appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.
Held, affirmed, sufficient evidence that injury was the result of accidental means
to go to the jury. Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 588
(Iowa 1948).
There has long been a dispute as to the meaning of the phrase "by accidental
means" as used in accident insurance policies. Two view have developed neither
of which is a clearly defined majority.1 One view takes the position that when the
means that caused the death or injury are exactly as the insured intended, the
means are not accidental, even though the result was unexpected and accidental. 2
The other view looks at the phrase from the layman's point of view and holds that
11. The State of Wyoming, ex rel Wyoming State Bar v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172,
156 P. (2d) 309 (1944).
12. Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N. J. Eq. 599, 53 A. (2d) 800 (Ch. 1947).
13. Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 209

(1st Dept. 1948).

1. See Note, 166 A. L. R. 469 (1947).
2. Horton v. Travelers Insurance Co., 45 Cal. App. 462, 187 Pac. 1070 (1920);
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Selden, 78 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 4th 1897); Husbands v. Indiana Tray. Ace. Ass'n, 194 Ind. 586, 133 N. E. 130 (1921);
Feder v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N. W. 252 (1899) ;
Kendall v. Tray. Protective Ass'n of America, 87 Ore. 179, 169 Pac. 751
1918).
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if the result was something unforeseen, unexpected or without intention it oc3
curred by accidental means.
In the instant case the lower court instructed the jury that, "By 'accidental
means' is meant those means, the effect of which does not ordinarily follow and
cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of these means; an effect which the
actor did not intend to produce and which he can not be charged with the design
of producing." 4 This instruction was not objected to and was taken as the law of
the case. It accords with the second view and is an indication of the courts tendency to accept the liberal view that there is no legal difference between the terms
accident and accidental means. 5 The average man thinks of accident as happening
unexpectedly, a result which does not ordinarily follow and many courts feel that
to change this concept and disallow recovery on a strict legal definition of accidental means would substantially impair the good of insurance.
In arriving at their decision the court had to determine if the voluntary act
of the insured in causing the gas to fill the room precluded recovery. This involved
a determination of the casual relationship and the application of .principles dealing
with causation. An English court held that the court must look at only the
6
immediate and proximate cause of death and not go back to cause upon cause. If
7
the means are voluntary the result must be unexpected, a result which the actor
did not intend to produce. However, if there is a danger present the actor must
know of this danger and then, in effect, assume the risk before he is barred from
recovery. 8 His intentional act without knowledge is not enough to disallow his
recovery. 9 Mere thoughtlessness alone has been held not to bar the actor from
recovery. 10
A wholly unintentional self-inflicted injury does not make it impossible to
11
One court said, "negligence
recover and simple negligence does not bar recovery.
setting in motion the chain of circumstances which cause or contribute to the
result does not operate to remove such result from the category of those caused
by accidental means." 12 The insured is not covered only those cases where he
3. Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P. (2d) 733 (1935);
Billings v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 81 Utah 572, 21 P. (3d) 103 (1933);
Lewis v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56, 7 A. L. R.
1129 (1918); McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 AtI.
(1888).
4. Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 588, 589 (Iowa 1948).
5. 29 Am. Jur. (Pocket Supplement) 69, sec. 933.1.
6. Lawrence v. The Accidental Ins. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216 (1881).
7. Hanna v. Rio Grande National Life Ins. Co., 181 S. W. (2,d) 908 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944).
8. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 6th 1897).
9. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Springsteen, 23 Ind. App. 657,
55 N. E. 973 (1900) ; Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Sittig, 181 Ill. 111, 54
N. E. 903 (1899).
10. Irwin v. Phoenix Accident and Sick Benefit Assn., 127 Mich. 630, 86 N. W.
1036 (1901).
11. Edwards v. Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 350 Mo. 666, 168 S. W.
(2d) 82 (1942); Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 174 Okla. 262,
51 P. (2d) 319 (1935); Zurich General Acc. and Liability Insurance Co. v.
Flickinger, 33 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th 1929), 68 A. L. R. 161.
12. Pyramid Life Insurance Co. v. Milner, 289 Ky. 249, 158 S. W. (2d) 429,
432 (1942).
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exercises great foresight and conducts himself with great caution. 13 When an
accident is the result of a miscalculation of a voluntary act it may be termed accidental.1 4 These rules have been applied by numerous courts in allowing recovery
for voluntary acts which result in injuries. 15 However there are also many courts
which restrict recovery and hold that something unexpected or unforeseen must
occur in the act which precedes and causes the injury. 16 Most courts are in accord
that if the injury or death is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act and
the only thing unforseen is the death or injury it does not occur by accidental
means.)7 One court has said it makes no difference if the insured did voluntarily
set in motion the first of a series of actions which resulted in the injury or death, he
can still recover.18
The tendency to construe an insurance policy against the insurer and to allow
recovery when the accident is of such a nature that the layman would consider it
an accident is apparently justified on the basis of public policy. For it would seem
inequitable to allow an insurance company to escape liability by the use of a
technical phrase the meaning of which has not even been determined with any
degree of unanimity by the courts.
ROBERT M. LITrLE

DAMAGES AND THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE

In 1934, plaintiff acquired certain property adjoining defendant railroad's
switch-yard which has been in use and operation since prior to 1926. The yard
comprised two main line tracks, running north and south, and a series of ten
tracks adjacent to and west of the main line used as switch tracks. The westernmost of this system of tracks, called a scale track, was within 100 ft. of plaintiff's
house. Plaintiff contends that defendant spotted its engine upon the scale track
nearer his house than was necessary, and that as a result, quantities of smoke, soot
and cinders and noxious vapors were cast upon his property causing him special
damage. Held, that, a railroad company is not liable to an abutting landowner,
under the eminent domain statute, for damages to the property after claims for
the original location and construction have been settled or barried by the statute
of limiations; and further, the court below erred in holding that the defendant
had created an "unnecessary nuisance" or private nuisance rather than a public
nuisance. Thompson v. Kimball, 165 F. (2d) 677, (C. C. A. 8th 1948).
13. Rustin v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Co., 58 Neb. 792, 79 N. W.
712 (1899).
14. Joseph A. Coy Co., Inc. v. Younger, 192 Okla. 348, 136 P. (2d) 890 (1943).
15. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N. W. (2d) 576 (1942);
Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935);
Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P. (2d) 733 (1935).
16. Donohue v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 259 Ky. 611, 82 S. W. (2d) 780
(1935); Parker v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., 178 La.
977, 152 So. 583 (1933); Losleben v. California State Life Insurance Co.,
133 Cal. App. 550, 24 P. (2d) 825 (1933).
17. Evans v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 594, 174 P.
(2d) 961, (1946).
18. Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 184 Iowa 423, 166 N. W.
363, 3 A. L. R. 1295 (1918), modified, 168 N. W. 884.

